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There are two kinds of participants, signers and requesters, in our blind signature scheme. A requester requests signatures from the signer, and the signer issues blind signatures to the requester. The proposed protocol consists of four phases: initiaiisation, requesting, signing, and extraction.. The signer publishes the necessary information in the initialisation phase. To obtain the signature of a message, a requester suLbmits an encrypted version of the message to the signer in the requesting phase. In the signing phase, the signer computes the blind signature of the message, and then sends the result back to the requester. Finally, the requester extracts the signature from the rersult he receives in the extraction phase. The details of our proposed scheme are presented as follows.
(i) Initialisation phase (the signer:): The signer randomly selects n = p,pzp3p4 where all the pt's are distinct large primes and p , 5 p2 = p3 = p4 = 3 (mod 4). Let [gllz] denotla the Jacobi symbol g over 12. The signer randomly chooses bo, bl, b,, and 6, in z",, such that [b,lp,] AnaZysis: We discuss the correctness, the security and the performance of our proposed scheme in i his Section. Theorem 1 ensures its correctness.
The authors propose a low-computation blind signature scheme based on quadratic residues. In the scheme, only a small number of modular computations need to be performed by every signature requester, and the privacy o i the requester is protected against the signer.
Introduction: Blind signature schemes are used to protect the privacy of users in many advanced communication services, such as untraceable electronic election and untraceable payment systems [l, 31. Owing to the fast progress of mobile computing, low-computation software and low-power hardware suitable for wireless communications have been widely studied. In this Letter, we present a low-computation blind signature scheme based on the scheme proposed in [2] . In our proposed scheme, only a few arithmetic modular computations are necessary to obtain a legal signature. Also, to verify a signature, only a small number of modular computations are required. Our blind sigmture scheme satisfies low-computation requirements and is suitable for low-power mobile communications. The security of our scheme relies on the difficulty of computing the square roots of an integer in Z n , where z", is the set of all positive integers less than and relatively prime to n. It is infeasible for the signer to derive the exact correspondence between the message he actually signs and the signature submitted by a requester for verification. Compared with the scheme of [2] , the security is strengthened, and the size of a legal signature is greatly reduced in our proposed scheme.
Low-computation blind signature scheme: Our blind signature scheme is based on the theory of quadratic residues. 1Jnder a modulus n, x is a quadratic residue (QR) in z*,, iff there exists an integer y in Zn such that y2 = x. Given x, it is infeasible to compute the square root y if It contains large prime factors and the factorisation of n is unknown [6] .
ELECTRONICS LETTERS 15th August 1996 Vol. 32 w2, w3, w4> is denoted by <w>. For every <a>= <a,, a2; a,, a,> and <w> = <w,, II):!, iv3, w p in z",z, <aw mod I+ = <uIwI mod pi, a2w2 mod p2, a3wj mod p3, u,w, mod pa>, <a1 mod n> = <a,-' mod p I , a,-l mod p2, ay1 mod p3, a, -I and p4>.
Assume that [(r2m(zi2+.4v2) )lp/l = ii for every j = I, 2, 3, 4. and [(b,,(x2+A) 
It is clear that mbk(cZ+A) is a QR in E,, because c* and c2mb,(c2+A) are QRs in Z,3. Since <e'> I= <e1 mod p,, c1 mod p,, c l mod p3, c l mod p4> = <:((E~~)~, (e 1)2, (e 1)3, (ei),>, the 16 square roots of c2 in z*, are <&(cl),, +(e1),, larly, if <d,, d,, d3 , d4> is a square root of vnb,(c2+A) in z*,, the 16 square roots of mb,<(c2+A) in z", are <kd,, idz, +d3, +d4>. Thus, the set of the 16 square roots of e 2ndk(e2+A) in z",, is {gh mod n 1 g is a square root of c2 in z", and h is a square root of n?b,(c2+A) mod n, c = (u',x,+Av',y,) mod n and e = (~'~y,-v',x,) mod n. And, if (r', 2n~(u', Z+Av', ' ) mod nj = z,. then the requester is requester i. It is quite time consuming to perform exhaustive comparisons to derive the link if the database kept by the signer is large, however, the signer can monitor a particular individual (or a small group) and quickly derive the link between a signature and its requester in the scheme proposed in [2] . Therefore, strengthening of the privacy of requesters in the scheme of [2] is greatly desired. In our proposed scheme, the privacy of requesters is strengthened to avoid the above attack by revealing less infoimation in the signature. If x is selected by the signer in the signing phase during a certain run of the proposed protocol, then for every signature (s. m, c, kj shown for verification, there exists a great amount of (U'. v')s such that c = (u'-ii'x)~'(u'.x+Av'j mod n. In addition, since all (Y, U , v)s are kept secret by the requesters, all signatures with the same k are equally likely from the signer's point of view. Therefore, it is computationally infeasible for the signer to derive the exact correspondence between the message (vzmb, (u2+Av2j(x2+A) mod n) he actually signs and the message (s, m, c, k ) submitted by a requester for verification later.
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Simi
Only a small number of modular arithmetic computations are performed by a requester in each phase of the proposed scheme.
In our scheme, to obtain a signature, a requester performs six multiplications and one addition operation in the requesting phase, and one inverse, seven multiplications, one addition, and one subtraction operation in the extraction phase. Only four multiplications, one addition, and one comparison operation are needed to verify a signature. All the above computations are performed in Z n . Moreover, the signature size is greatly reduced in our scheme, since the size of the signature (s. ni, c, k ) is -60% of (s, m, b, e, e) of [2] , where k is a two-bit number.
Z,,. Therefore, s2 E, , mb, , (c2+A) . Conclusions: In this Letter, a low-computation and secure blind signature technique has been presented. The correctness, security, and performancc of the proposed scheme have also been discussed. The privacy of all requesters is protected against the signer. Compared with the original scheme, the security of our proposed blind signature scheme is strengthened. Furthermore, the blind signature scheme achieves the low-computation requirements for mobile requesters, and the storage required in our proposed scheme is much less than at required in the original scheme. who may or may not be the original signer, to share the signature among a set of proxies so that the honest proxies can later reconstruct it. At the end of the sharing phase, each proxy can verify whether a valid signature for the document can be reconstructed, even if the original signature holder and / or some proxies are malicious. In addition, malicious proxies gain no information about the signature held by an honest sharer prior to reconstruction (but do see the document itself). Some efficient VZS schemes for exponetiation based signatures (e. g. RSA, Rabin) and discrete log based signatures (e. g. ElGamal, Schnorr, DSA) have been presented in [l] . However, the VCS scheme for the DSA is not secure at all. In this Letter I would like to point out that the VCS scheme for the DSA does not possess heuristic security, and propose an improved scheme which possesses heuristic security.
E S for DSA proposed by Franklin et al.: In the DSA, the public key is g: J', p, q where p is a large prime, q is a large prime factor of p-1. g is a generator of Z,*, and y = gx mod p for some private Improved scheme: An improved VCS scheme for the DSA is as follows: the sharer reliably broadcasts m, Y, a, A to all proxies, where a = yuz mod p , A = aJ mod p. The sharer verifiably shares s to the proxies so that they are convinced that it is the log of s mod q with respect to the base a. The proxies accept if they accept the
